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ABSTRACT
Land trusts andothermarket-basedapproachesto conservationhave

gained increasing visibility in recent years. We investigate the
degreeto which these new policiesindicatea "shift to privatization"
in U.S. conservationpolicy. Our review indicates that instead of a

clear shift towards private alternatives, we are seeing a growing
complexity of policy arrangements affecting private lands that

mirrorsthe policyfragmentationthat took place on public lands 100
years ago. This growing policy complexity is reinforced by new
theoretical approaches to property law, including Joseph Sax's
"economy of nature" perspective on private land ownership.
Finally, we consider some of the implications of this new blurring

between public and private rights, including those of public
accountability and impacts on minority and low-income
communities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental policy has become increasingly entangled with
private property rights, especially those pertaining to land. The closeness
of the relationship reflects two distinct trends. On the one hand, growing
awareness of the connections between living systems has promoted the goal
of ecosystem management and the protection of natural resources across a
mix of public and private land. On the other, property rights are being
created to address new environmental challenges, like air and water
pollution, that previously have been regulated in a less market-based, more
command-and-control manner. Both trends constitute a challenge to the
Progressive/Conservationist focus on public ownership and management
by government experts for resource conservation.
Indeed, the growing interest in private lands and private property
in general has led some authors to conclude that the Progressive Era model
of resource management is crumbling away, awaiting replacement by an as
yet unspecified alternative.2 Although we share some sympathy with this
perspective (and indeed have embraced the idea ourselves in print on more
than one occasion), we are increasingly inclined to feel that this view is too
simple and leads to misguided conclusions about new policies appearing
in the environmental arena. This article is presented, therefore, as a
preemptive response to an emerging narrative in environmental policy: as
Progressive Era mechanisms and ideals break down, we are presently
undergoing a "shift to privatization" in policy.3 By "shift to privatization,"
we mean specifically a coherent movement toward policies that have four
qualities in particular:
(1)

They promote conservation on private lands;

(2)

They rely on market-based mechanisms including the
following:
(2.1) Depending primarily on voluntary actions by
private actors;

2. Some of the predictions are, of course, our own. See SALLY FAIRFAX & DARLA
GUENZLER, CONSERVATION TRuSTS 3-25 (2001). See generally ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS
AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILURE OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1995).
3. The best general source is LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990's PROPERTYRIGHTS REBELLION (Bruce
Yandle ed., 1995). See Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement: How It Began and
Where It Is Headed, in Yandle, supra,at 1. See also Nancy Ehrenreich, A Trend: The Progressive
Potentialin Privatization, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1235 (1996) (indicating the prevalence of the
privatization idea in modem politics generally, but also supporting the idea that "private"
alternatives to government can break down public-private distinctions and advance the liberal
agenda).
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(2.2)
(2.3)

Providing compensation to private actors for
meeting environmental goals beyond a
certain, basic threshold level; and,
Utilizing or contracting with privategroups to
achieve conservation objectives.

It is important to note that there is no definitive proclamation of
such a shift in the literature on environmental policy to date. However, we
do see numerous signs that this story is gaining credibility as the latest
trend in environmental policy at the turn of the twenty-first century.
Besides the aforementioned declarations of the demise of the Progressive
Era, the privatization narrative arises in settings as diverse as the Kyoto
Protocol,' the acid rain provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments,5
and the emergence of land trusts.6 The new policy direction is sometimes
seen as a reaction, welcome or otherwise, to decades of inefficient, intrusive,
and mal-administered environmental regulations.7 In the same vein,
support for these ostensibly private policy alternatives is frequently
accompanied by a yearning for an earlier understanding of private property
based on Lockean ideals,! Perverse incentives9 are now ebbing, advocates
of this shift might tell us, washed away by a rising tide of private,
marketbased transactions.

4. Approval of the Kyoto Protocol continues to rely heavily on the question of "marketbased" mechanisms for compliance, including emissions trading between nations and "credits"
for emissions reductions made in other countries through the "joint implementation" and
"clean development mechanism" programs. See generally SEBASTIAN OBERTHUR &HERMANN
E. OrT, THE KYO'ro PROTOCOL (1999).
5. Title IVof the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments included an innovative new program
to control emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO) by utilities, a significant contributor to the problem
of acid rain. The Title IV program installed a cap and trade system, requiring utilities to obtain
an "emission allowance" for every ton of SO, they emitted per year. Allowances are very much
like private property rights, being fully-tradable among utilities and other buyers (including
environmentalists). To date, the program has witnessed nearly 100 percent compliance by
utilities and a significant reduction in SO,emissions as a result. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
Doc. No. EPA-430-R-00-007, 1999 ACID RAIN PROGRAM COMPUANCE REPORT (1999); Brian J.
McLean, Evolution of Marketable Permits: The U.S. Experience with Sulfur Dioxide Allowance

Trading, 8 INT'L. J.ENV'T &POLLUTION 19,20-22 (1997).
6. See infra part IV.
7. SeegenerallyHELENINGRAM&STEvENRATHGEBSMrIT, PuBuCPoLicYFOR DEMOCRACY
(1993). See FAIRFAX &GUENZLER, supra note 2, at ch. 1.
8. See, e.g., Yandle, supra note 3, at ix-xviii. For a more visceral window, see American
Land Rights Association, Home Page,at http://www.landrights.org (last visited Aug. 3,2002)
(providing links to many useful websites such as that of LAND).
9. See generally RANDAL OTOOLE, REPORMING THE FOREST SERVICE (1998) (describing
Forest Service mismanagement in terms of bad direction expressed in agency budgets). See also
Randal O'Toole, Reforming the Forest Soviet, 97 J. FORESTRY 34 (1999).
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The idea that we are privatizing environmental policy provides an
antidote, or at least an antipode, to an equally simple understanding of the
turn-of-the-twentieth-century Progressive Era."0 The received wisdom
regarding that period describes a policy shift from disposition to permanent
retention of the federal public domain. We have previously spilt
considerable ink detailing our reservations about this story; these concerns
are summarized in part II of the present text." Suffice it to say for now that
we found limited evidence for any such shift; instead, we described the
period as one marked by a fragmentation of policies with respect to public
lands. While some lands were clearly retained by the government, the idea
that there was any sort of coherent movement towards a unified policy of
full federal ownership is incorrect.12
Indeed, we found that the Progressive Era narrative of a shift
towards public ownership for conservation has deeply confused subsequent
debate regarding public lands, particularly after the Second World War.
Herein we will argue that the original "shift" narrative's shortcomings also
feed misperceptions with respect to private lands in the present era. Most
notably, the deep lines allegedly drawn during the Progressive Era between
public and private lands provide an unrealistic starting point for any
modem shift to privatization narrative. In reality, the ideas of public and
private blurred together on the federal lands during this period. Taking this
blurring as fundamental, in this article we build upon our previous analysis
in an effort to deepen our understanding of the current policy environment
with respect to private property.
With one element of the modern privatization story we have no
cavil: both sides of the environmental debate are increasingly interested in
private property in general and private land in particular. 3
Environmentalists want to extend government control over private land in
more and more ecologically-driven detail. In part, they are looking to

10. For the basic story on the Progressive Era, see Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax,
Fragmentationof Public Domain Law and Policy, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J.649,656-60. See generally
SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY (1959); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE

SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (1967) (detailing the beginning of the era).
11. See generally Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10. See also infra part II.
12. Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10, at 651.
13. However, focusing on private rather than public lands does not signal a privatized or
marketized approach to conservation issues. We are reminded that diverse advocates, with
fundamentally incompatible goals and institutions for public domain management, generally
agreed on the advisability of federal land retention. For example, both John Muir and Gifford
Pinchot favored federal land retention-Pinchot for use and development, Muir to achieve
wilderness protection. And while Muir supported using the army to protect the forest reserves,
Pinchot opposed that in favor of developing a corps of scientific foresters trained at Yale. See
John Muir, Gifford Pinchot, et al., A Plan to Save the Forests: Forest Preservation by Military
Control, 49 CENTURY 626, 630-32 (1895).
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market-based mechanisms to extend conservation onto private lands
because of growing opposition to traditional forms of government
regulation. That opposition rallies around the Fifth Amendment and the
need to protect private property from government interference. 14 Such
Lockean concerns are augmented by other worries about gridlock and
corruption in political processes that have also given rise to an interest in
market-based alternatives. 5 A growing reliance on "contracting out"
government functions and "inviting in" participation of private, nongovernmental organizations 6 has also contributed to this trend. 7
In light of this increased focus on private lands and markets, the
idea that we are moving into an era of private property rights, marketbased policies, and other alternatives to the dreary task of making and
enforcing coercive regulations is alluring. Unfortunately, it is also
misleading at best. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to argue against
a shift to privatization narrative, and to offer a more complex alternative in
its stead. We will argue that rather than a reassertion of private ownership
rights and an outright rejection of Progressive Era concepts, we are actually
experiencing a continued blurring of ideas about property and policy with
respect to private lands, much like what occurred on federal lands in the
Progressive Era. This blurring is reflected in numerous modem policy
innovations, including the leading examples of conservation easements and
land trusts.
Thus, we interpret the current debate as an elaboration rather than
a rejection of Progressive Era notions of property and land use policy. In
making this claim, we are well aware that when we turn to current events,
we lose the advantages of hindsight that we enjoyed in our review of the
Progressive Era. We have no equivalent of Gifford Pinchot to anchor the
presently emerging narrative. Nor do we have a clear picture of what
happens next. But we are convinced that in the current rush of attention
towards private property and market-based policy, we risk embarking on

14. See generally Yandle, supranote 3 (outlining many of the specifics of this opposition
and speaking of a movement, a rebellion, or a revolution); id. at ix.
15. See generally INGRAM & SMITH, supranote 7; PETER BARNES, WHOOWNS THE SKY? OUR
COMMON ASSETS AND THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM (2001).
16. See generally BEYOND PRIVATIZATION: THE ToOs OF GOVERNMENT ACTION (Lester
Salamon ed., 1989); LESTERSALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE: GOvERNMENT-NON-PROFrr
RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE (1995); NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT:

COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT (Elizabeth Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 1999).
17. Economists, of course, have a long tradition of preferring market solutions to
environmental problems, most notably institutionalized in Resources for the Future (RFF). The

emergence of the New Resource Economics, as institutionalized in organizations like the
Political Economy Research Center (PERC) and the private property rights movement may be
only a difference of degree rather than of substance.
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another era of miscommunication and misunderstanding. Like the shift to
retention story, the shift to privatization idea contains some obvious
elements of truth while concealing important changes in policy affecting
private lands that elaborate, in many ways, on the changes we saw on
public lands 100 years ago.
We will make our case with both empirical and theoretical
arguments. We begin in part I by quickly summing up our earlier analysis
of the Progressive Era to show how diversifying ideas of property and other
changes in U.S. political economy resulted in a crazy quilt of policy
outcomes on public lands. Using this analysis as a guide of sorts, we will
then ask, in two empirical settings, whether the modem "shift" idea is any
more realistic. In part I, we use the criteria of "voluntary, compensatory,
and private" to evaluate the relative "privateness" of a range of modem
policies with respect to private lands. We find, not surprisingly, that the
evidence for a shift to privatization from this review is not convincing. We
then look in part IV at the emergence of land trusts as the strongest case for
the privatization argument. Even here, we conclude, there is no evidence
of a clear shift towards privatization; there is simply even more
fragmentation of policy options and more blurring of the distinction
between the terms "public" and "private."
Moving to a more theoretical question, we then ask in part V
whether the changes documented in parts III and IV are indicative of a
movement away from Progressive Era ideas about ownership. As noted
above, we find that current changes appear to be a further elaboration of
Progressive Era trends and not a reversal or rejection of them in favor of
older Lockean concepts. Finally, in part VI, we discuss the practical
implications of our argument. First and foremost, what are the equity
implications of our new and ostensibly private policy-making efforts?
Second, and not unrelated, how do we ensure continued public
accountability under new, mixed public-private arrangements? Our
conclusion is that the new institutional arrangements present a number of
challenges regarding the allocation of public resources and environmental
benefits and liabilities more generally. In addition, in the absence of a clear
process of accountability, we must be even more vigilant than we have been
in holding government agencies' toes to the fire. This vigilance is required
not only on behalf of the aspirations of aesthetic and ecological advocates,
but also for less enfranchised fellow citizens. Our fear is that urban poor
and minorities risk being even less well served under these new policy
options than under previous regimes, while the notion that such policies are

18. Chuck Geisler's efforts to the contrary notwithstanding. See generallyCharles Geisler,
PropertyPluralism,in PROPERTYAND VALuES: ALTERNATIVESTOPUBuCANDPRIVATEOWNERSHIP

65 (Gail Daneker & Charles Geisler eds., 2000).
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"private" alternatives to regulation may exempt them from adequate public
scrutiny and concern. In this respect, the "shift to privatization" narrative
could have important negative outcomes.
II. THE PROGRESSIVE ERA-A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT
We start by summarizing our earlier article 9 as a basis for the
current analysis. Beginning roughly 125 years ago, law and policy regarding
property, ownership, and government underwent a deep reorientation.'
The ensuing clash of ideas is clearly etched in policy regarding federally
owned lands in the western states and territories. The pervasive narrative
about the period describes a "shift to retention" in federal land policy."
After spending a century transferring public domain land as rapidly as
possible into private ownership, the story goes, in the late nineteenth
century the government began to hold onto land in order to conserve and
manage it. Although this simplistic tale continues to shape our
understanding of both conservation history and the nature of public control
over federal lands, the reality was far more complex.
While the idea that the federal government might retain vast tracts
of the western United States in public ownership became viable during the
Progressive Era, we discern no sweeping movement toward a policy of
federal land ownership. The underlying assumption of the Progressive
conservation agenda was that private ownership was inadequate to protect
land and resources, necessitating public ownership for environmental
protection.' The details of the resulting forms of public ownership varied
greatly, however, as land policy fragmented into a variety of title and
management arrangements-an admixture of public and private rights on
19. See generally Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10.
20. See generally id. at 669-71. For more detailed treatments, see generally STEPHEN
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING ANEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OFNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982); WIEBE, supra note 10.

21. See generally Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10, at 660-62. The first blush of this "shift"
notion is found in THOMAS DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, ITS HISTORY WITH STATISTICS
(1880). The first full articulation is probably MARION CLAWSON, UNCLE SAM'S ACRES 16-17

(1951).
22. See Joseph Sax's discussion of Sir John Lubbock in Joseph L. Sax, Is Anyone Minding
Stonehenge? The Origins of Cultural PropertyProtection in England, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1543, 1550
(1990). Lubbock, an early advocate of historic preservation in the United Kingdom, in his
argument for government protection of historic ruins had two implications that were radical
at the time: first, that private proprietorship was insufficient to ensure the protection of the
artifacts; and second, that the duty of protection required a much enlarged role for the
government. It would allow the government to "affirmatively veto" the owner's priorities. See
also generallyJoseph L. Sax, HeritageProtectionas a PublicDuty: The Abbe Gregoireand the Origins
of an Idea, 88 MICH. L.REV. 1142 (1990); JOSEPH L SAx, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS INCULTURAL TREASURES (1999).
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what we uniformly refer to as the federal or public lands. Those
arrangements reflected changes in the political economy of the era,
including new ideas about property,23 the rise of scientific management
within the growing federal bureaucracy,' and a greater sense of national
identity.' The result was not a dean shift from one policy to another, but
an extremely complex mixture of government and private ownership and
control over land and resources.
In particular, fragmentation of the idea of property was of critical
importance. During the Progressive Era, the instrumental conception of
ownership associated with legal scholars like Morris Cohen gained
significant acceptance.2" The instrumental view declares property to be a
political device. As such, property can be used to further the collective goals
of society and is subject to modification by government as those collective
goals change over time. This notion of property supported the Progressives'
larger agenda of social reform. It endorsed the manipulation of property to
improve public health, mitigate workplace abuses, and generally achieve
a more equitable apportionment of both the goods and ills created by the
gilded era.' Accordingly, property on this account is a political right
serving social ends.28
Cohen's ideas can be distinguished easily from the Lockean or
intrinsicnotion of property that had dominated American thought for most
of the nation's history. Locke describes property as a pre-political (or
natural) right of unilateral appropriation. Property arises, in Locke's
familiar allegory, through labor: someone removes something from the state
of nature, making it her property, by mixing her sweat with it. Property
thus serves the goals of specific individuals who formed the state largely to
protect it and therefore is entitled to unwavering protection from political
modification. 9

23. Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10, at 691-711. See generally,MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRisis OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY, ch. 5 (1992);
WILLIAM B. Scorr, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPmEss: AMERICAN CONcEInONs OF PROPERTY FROM THE
SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1977).

24. See generally HAYS, supra note 10.
25. See generally WIEBE, supra note 10.
26. See Raymond & Fairfax, supranote 10, at 686-89. The key references are in note 180 and
include Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1967);
MoRRISR. COHEN, REASON AND LAW: STUDIESINJURISTIC PHILOSOPHY (1950); MORRIS R. COHEN,
STUDIES INPHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE (1949); MORRIS R. COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL (1946).
27. The best general source on the split in Progressive's urban social agenda and its more
environmental element is ROBERTGOTTLIEB, FORcINGTHESPRING:THETRANSFORMATIONOFTHE
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (1993).
28. See Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10, at 682-83.
29. Id. at 683-84 (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285-302 (P. Laslett
ed., 1960)); see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
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Expanding the reach of the idea of property while dividing and
separating the various powers of ownership was another key development
in the late nineteenth century. During this period, increasingly abstract and
intangible entities (such as corporations and ideas) became both owners and
subjects of ownership." Meanwhile, the traditional connection between
ownership and absolute control over one's property weakened. Instead of
a strong and coherent notion of the unified powers of ownership of physical
items, the right of property began to split into a number of divisible "sticks"
within the "bundle of rights" that came to symbolize ownership at the
time.3 The metaphor complemented the emerging view of property as
exchange value rather than simply a physical object.32
While the instrumental view of property gained significant traction
during this period, it never fully replaced the ideas of Locke in American
political economy.' Lockean ideas based on first possession and ownership
as a reward for labor remain influential in American law and society to the
present day.' Yet clearly by the end of the Progressive Era we were no
longer the same near-perfect children of Locke, so dear to Louis Hartz,s as
we had been prior to the Civil War. Unmistakably, more instrumental
notions of ownership associated with scholars like Morris Cohen were
added to the mix as we complicated our understanding of both property
and government.
The policy consequences of this blurring were significant. First,
although public land ownership did in fact emerge as a constitutionally
approved and publicly accepted option, management responsibilities were
divided among many competing agencies. 6 Second, and partially as a result
of the first, policy began to divide the land and resources. Land, water,
trees, scenic and natural wonders, and wildlife were sorted out among
different agencies and professions, further fragmenting the whole
enterprise of conservation. 7 Third, policies with respect to public land
ownership did not move in lockstep towards retention; instead, they
embodied a surprisingly diverse set of title arrangements and management
a
strategies. 3

30. See Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10, at 695-98; See also HORwriZ, supranote 23, at ch.
5; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 255-57,435-38,521 (2d ed. 1985).
31. HoRwrIz, supra note 23, at 149. See also E.T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of
Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV. 77,97 (1995).
32. See Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10, at 695-98.
33. Id. at 710.
34. Id. at 685-86.
35. See generally Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION INAMERICA (1955).
36. See Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10, at 727-31, 738-39, 747.
37. Id. at 747.
38. Id. at 727-47.
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This diversity of policies is summarized in Table 1. Some federal
lands, including those containing scenic wonders, antiquities, and certain
untouched stands of timber, were strongly retained by the government in
accordance with the traditional shift to retention narrative.39 On these lands,
the degree of public control was strongest. On other federal properties,
however, the story was much different. An increasingly emphatic
commitment to continuing disposition' was in fact the most prominent
public land policy during the period in which a "shift-to-retention" is
supposed to be taking place. Homesteading" continued with heavy
subsidies under the Reclamation Act and the enlarged grants of the Stock
Raising Homestead Act of 1916.42 This emphasis on disposition reflected the
larger Progressive social agenda: all retention of land was intended, at least
rhetorically, to serve the family farmer creating a home in the wilderness.43
Table 1 - Fragmentation of Public Land Policy
1872-1349
Category
Strong Retention
Reserve andRescind

Nominal Retention

PartialRetention
ContinuedDisposition

39.

Examples
Some timber lands (e.g., wilderness areas)
Parks with scenic wonders
Irrigation reserves
Indian reservations
Some forest reserves
Forest Service grazing lands (after WWI)
Dept. of Interior mineral lands
Oil and coal mineral lands
Split estates (Stockraising Homestead Act)
Some National Park properties
Multiple homesteading laws through 1934
Ongoing hardrock mining claims

Id. at 734-39.

40. The term "disposition" is typically used to gloss a wide variety of Congressional
policies--sales; grants to states, corporations, and private individuals; and homesteading-that
transferred the public domain from government to state or private ownership.
41. Homesteading is the most familiar and arguably the least important of the disposition
era policies. The Homesteading Act, which promised 160 acres of free land to "actual settlers,"
finally passed in 1862 when southern representatives in Congress had left. Homestead Act of
1862, ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976) (allowing entry and patent of 160 acres of public
domain land); see also The Desert Lands Act of 1877,43 U.S.C. §§ 321-329 (1994) (expanding
opportunities for settlement in the arid areas of the west by providing for entry on 320 acres
with patent to the land to be issued upon proof that the land had been irrigated).
42. Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10, at 737-38; Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916,43
U.S.C. § 294 (repealed 1976).
43. GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION 21-23 (1911).
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Another key category was lands that were nominally retainedby the
government. While the federal government continued to hold title to these
parcels, which included grazing districts and mineral lands delegated to
various federal agencies, effective control was given to local users." This
"nominal" form of retention relied heavily on the fragmentation of
ownership and control noted above.45 To a substantial degree, the nominal
retention arrangement remains in effect for many public lands to the
present day." Closely related are lands that were partiallyretained.The Stock
Raising Homestead Act, for example, simply divided the earth into two
separate estates, retaining the subsurface minerals while disposing of the
surface estate.' Even while establishing the National Park Service in 1916,
Congress simultaneously opened parks and monuments to timber
harvesting and livestock grazing.48
Further eroding the "shift-to-retention" theme are the many public
land reservations that were reserved-and-rescinded.This process took several
forms. Notably, extensive reservations for American Indians and early
irrigation surveys eventually were opened to disposal, the latter ironically
during the same year (1891) that forest reservation authority was granted
to the president.49 In the early 1900s, Congress also opened existing forest
reservations to homesteading, grazing, and minerals entry.s'
What this all means is that public domain policy did not shift
consistently towards simple retention in the Progressive Era but rather
became much more complicated. Where once were private lands and a
presumption that federally owned land would eventually become, in the
main, private, we now found lands called "public" but actually utilized and
managed under a somewhat astounding array of public and private
controls. Many of these ostensibly public lands were in fact shot-through

44. Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10, at 73943.
45. Id. at 740-41.
46. Id. at 745-46.
47. Id. at 744.
48. id. at 738-39. The National Park Service "Organic Act" is much discussed in terms of
the putative conflict between the "preserve" and the "enjoy" elements of its mandate, which
is frequently glossed and lamented as irreconcilable. As an antidote the whole statute can be
found at 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) or in LARY M. DILSAVER, AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM: THE
CRITICAL DOCUMENTS 46-47 (1994).
49. Raymond& Fairfax, supra note 10, at 718-20, 733-34. See also Forest Reserve Act of 1891
ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (repealed 1976).
50. Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10, at 723-24. See 16 U.S.C. § 476 (repealed 1976). See
also SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY: ITS DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 123-32 (2d ed. 1980).
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with diverse private claims. Other policies separated resources among
diverse agencies and "partial" owners, further complicating the issue."1
Where land title is thus fragmented, the statement that a piece of
property is public is sometimes confusing and limits our understanding of
the actual allocation of rights. Using the term "public" to describe diverse
properties such as the nominally retained grazing districts established
under the Taylor Grazing Act,52 the split mineral estates in the Powder
River Basin, and Fred Harvey's vacation empire in Yosemite National Park
clearly holds little analytical or descriptive power. We conclude therefore
that despite the best efforts of Pinchot and others, the Progressive Era did
not mark a clear shift toward a single new category of lands remaining
under unqualified federal ownership and control. Rather, it signaled a
distinct blurring of the meaning of ownership itself that played out on these
various public properties. Lands we have become accustomed to thinking
of as public (or federal) are, in significant part, owned, controlled, and/or
developed by private entrepreneurs. And this blurring is exactly what we
now see continuing in the present era of putatively private, voluntary, and
compensated conservation.
III. PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARDS CONSERVATION ON PRIVATE
LANDS-EVIDENCE OF A SHIFT?
In this section and the next, we draw inspiration from our analysis
of the Progressive Era to discuss environmental policy on private lands in
the present day. We start by noting that modem environmentalists have
embraced a significantly different set of conservation priorities than those
of their Progressive predecessors. The emphasis nowis on preventing urban
sprawl and preserving wildlife habitat, watersheds, and natural systems
that cross multiple property lines. Because private land is central to
achieving these goals, advocates have increasingly concluded that pursuing
protections on public land alone is inadequate.53 Partially in response to this
growing pressure for regulation of private land, others have argued that
private stewardship and market-based incentives can improve on the
results of government programs that protect the environment. Accordingly,
if a shift to privatization is truly emerging, we ought to be able to identify
new policies that are moving towards these tools and away from

51. See Raymond &Fairfax, supra note 10, at 728-30,732-33,73941. See alsoSally K. Fairfax
et al., The FederalForests Are Not What They Seem: Formaland Informal Claims to FederalLands, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 630,634-41 (1999).
52. The Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1934).
53. Discussed in FAIRFAX &GuENZLER,supra note 2, at 12-13.
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traditional, Progressive ideas of top-down management by government
experts.
To explore that thesis, we shall review a wide range of policies
affecting conservation on private lands in terms of three adjectives that are
central to the shift-to-privatization narrative: voluntary, compensated, and
private. Our goal in this section is simple. We are looking for dear
movement away from involuntary, uncompensated, and public controls
over private lands toward approaches with the opposite qualities. This
section will focus on policies undertaken or implemented directly by
government, leaving the distinctive case of conservation efforts by private
actors like community land trusts to the following section.
For the limited purposes of the discussion that follows, we will
center our understanding of voluntariness on the process by which changes
to the conditions of private land ownership are decided upon. Was the new
arrangement consented to or negotiated by the affected landowner, or was
it compelled or extracted? Obviously at some point we will trip over the
notion of political consent here--especially when "involuntary" land use
decisions are made by local governments and therefore may be presumed
to have involved a landowner more or less directly. Nevertheless, we will
speak below in terms of direct landowner involvement in the transaction at
issue and not confuse ourselves with the larger question of political
participation.
We will simplify our use of the terms "compensation" and
"private" in a parallel manner. For compensation, we will focus on the
monetary, financial benefits the landowner receives in the transaction. And
we will define a "private" transaction in two ways. First, was any money
involved spent freely and openly by private interests to further their own
priorities, or was it paid for with government dollars? Second, who decided
the terms of the land use control; that is, what restrictions will be imposed
and on what parcels? Private transactions will make those choices without
government direction or funding. We realize that we still risk confusing
ourselves with even those gross definitions since we continue to use the
terms "public land" and "private land," as well as "public ownership" and
"private ownership," in the standard sense of identifying the formal fee
holder. Nevertheless, if we are careful, we should be able to avoid capsizing
the discussion completely.
Some leading modem methods for controlling private land use for
conservation are summarized, along with their relevant qualities, in Table
2. Several general points emerge from a quick perusal of this data. One is
that six of the seven options rely on government actors for their
implementation. Thus, right away it should be apparent that any ostensible
shift to privatization is substantially qualified by the ongoing, significant
role of government agents. Second, three out of six public options for
controlling private land remain uncompensated and involuntary, making
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them especially poor candidates for supporting a shift to privatization story.
Of course, the relative importance of the various policies in the table could
be changing significantly, despite the fact that they all remain viable options
for modem policy makers. This possibility will be considered in detail
below. Nevertheless, the initial impression given by the table is that reports
of the demise of the Progressive-like strategy of using public experts to
control land use and development seem premature.
A. Public, Involuntary, and Uncompensated Policies
Private land use has always been subject to a number of public
controls. As described below, the common law has restrained private land
use for centuries from certain actions that were a nuisance to other
landowners, or that violated other equitable doctrines like the public trust.
In addition, other forms of government regulation have increasingly
restricted the freedom of private landowners in the twentieth century.
While the influence of some of these coercive public powers may have
peaked in the 1970s and 1980s, there can be little doubt that they remain a
central part of our current portfolio for controlling private land use for
conservation.
One of the most important of these coercive options is zoning.
Upheld as a constitutional expression of the police power by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the landmark 1926 decision Euclid v. Ambler,' zoning is
an important tool for separating residential from commercial areas, defining
reasonable uses of property in the close quarters of urban life, and
protecting public and private investments in land and facilities.' Following
the Second World War, zoning became an increasingly vital element of
county and city planning. Both planning and zoning retain an important
role in land conservation policy today in spite of growing criticism of the
tool itself, as well as increasingly effective efforts by property rights
advocates to limit restrictions on private development without
compensation.5
Unlike local zoning rules, federal regulations affecting private
property for conservation waited until the 1970s to take flight. Modem laws

54.
55.

Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,387-88 (1926).
Two of the most useful books on the subject are RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING

GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND PoLmCS (1969) and ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND USE REGULATION (1977).
56. RANDAL O'TOoLE, THE VANISHING AUTOMOBILE AND OTHER URBAN MYTHS: How

SMART GROWTH WILL HARM AMERICAN CITIES (2001). This book inveighs against the most
recent manifestation of urban planners.
57. For the most recent major case in the field, see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S.

1003(1992).
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like the Clean Air Act,' the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) ° all gave the federal government a powerful role in the
regulation of private land use for the first time. These laws, and others like
them, created an enhanced federal role as well as enormous state regulatory
programs concerning private land. For in spite of their titles, there should
be no mistaking that these three statutes turn, in significant part, on
regulating use and development of private property. For "non-point"
pollution sources in both air and water, land use plans are the answer, and
for wetlands protection, the sky's the limit.61 For the ESA, concern over
wildlife habitat on private lands has translated into even more restrictions
on use and development.62
Finally, the public trust doctrine is less frequently considered as a
modem restraint on private land use but remains a vital part of
conservation law in many states. While the detailed origins of the doctrine'
need not concern us here, suffice it to say that the doctrine underscores the
idea that private land in the United States is considered to be held by the
present or a prior sovereign and is subject, upon granting to private
individuals, to terms that inhere in the nature of sovereignty. Title to land
is accordingly not "absolute." No matter how clear the deed, grant, or terms
and conditions of the contract that ostensibly gave the private landowner
dominion over a piece of land, that title is always subject to underlying
limits of public rights.
All of these restraints on private landowners are involuntary and
uncompensated. While landowners do have considerable opportunity to
influence zoning and planning processes through politically responsive city
and county councils, nevertheless, in the end they must obey the edicts of
these public officials. Federal regulations are even more coercive, having
been formulated at the national rather than the local level, making less
persuasive any notion of implied political acquiescence by private
landowners. The judge-made public trust doctrine ignores the wishes of the
private landowner in favor of the larger needs of the political community.
Moreover, none of these policies or doctrines provide compensation-in all

58.

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (1994).

59. Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
60. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1534 (1994).
61. See Freyfogle, supra note 31, at 74.
62. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
63. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Low: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 475-77 (1970); Jan S.Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's
Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 195, 195-98
(1980). See also Raymond & Fairfax, supranote 10, at 707-09 (discussing the public trust doctrine
with considerably less wisdom but admirable brevity).
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cases, affected landowners must support the economic burdens of these
regulatory decisions themselves.
As involuntary, uncompensated, and public controls over private
land use, these are the policy options we would expect to see weakening
significantly if a shift to privatization story were accurate. In recent years,
aggressive land use regulations in places like North Carolina and Oregon
have been struck down as unconstitutional takings of private property,
providing at least a murky outer boundary on what local governments can
do with this particular kind of policy." Meanwhile, federal environmental
regulations have entered a period of retrenchment and stalemate since the
1980s, with environmental advocates focusing primarily on maintaining
existing regulations rather than expanding them.' The ESA has yet to be
formally reauthorized, for example, despite having expired in 1992, while
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) continues to struggle with an
effective approach to non-point source pollution stemming from
agricultural practices and other private land uses under the CWA.6 These
limits indicate that alternative policy options more friendly to private
property could ultimately take on greater importance.
It would be a huge overstatement, however, to translate this
discernible hiccup in regulatory policy into a "shift" to alternative, marketbased approaches. While local land use planning may have reached a
plateau, large-lot zoning remains an important tool in many areas for
controlling growth and preserving open space and habitat on private
lands.67 In addition, the ESA remains by most accounts the single most
important environmental law for controlling private land use and
development.' Even the public trust doctrine, which languished somewhat
after the Progressive Era, reemerged to play a key role in environmental
disputes of the 1970s and 1980s.' These modem cases even expanded the
doctrine beyond its traditional "bed and banks" limitations to include
public rights in a variety of ecological and recreational resources in addition

64.

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,384 (1994).

65. See RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES:
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 280-83 (1999).
66. MICHAEL E. KRAFt, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND PoLmcs 110, 175 (2d ed. 2001).
67. See generally JOHN HART, FARMING ON THE EDGE: SAVING FAMILY FARMS INMARIN
COUNTY, CALIFORNIA (1991).
68. Joseph Sax goes so far as to argue that the ESA has become a key tool toward
achieving integrated planning among federal, state, local, and private lands. Joseph L. Sax, The
Ecosystem Approach: New Departuresfor Land and Water, Closing Remarks, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883,

886(1997).
69. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374,381 (1971); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior
Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983).
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to the original largely commercial foci." This is hardly the pattern we
would expect during a "shift to privatization."
Instead, we see a pattern very similar to the "fragmentation" of
policies on public lands that occurred 75 to 100 years ago. Traditional,
coercive public controls over private land use appear to have reached a
limit of sorts, at least for now. But they have not been replaced by more
voluntary and compensated alternatives relying on private actors. Instead,
some new ideas and options have taken a place beside these more
traditional approaches, expanding the array of methods for affecting private
land use, and making the tenure arrangements on private lands a more
complicated mix of public and private claims and entitlements. A few of
these alternatives to traditional, Progressive-inspired policy options are
described below.
B. Alternatives-Public Policies that Are Voluntary, Compensated, or
Both
Not every arrangement for conservation on private land is
involuntary and uncompensated. Some alternatives, like eminent domain
proceedings providing compensation to the landowners, have been around
for centuries.' Others, including incentive-based programs for conservation
of important natural resources on private property, are slightly more
modern innovations. In addition, the rise of federal regulations affecting
private land use has created a secondary set of policies at the local level
designed to help landowners with the new costs of compliance. Taken as a
whole, these alternatives to uncompensated, mandatory regulations are
clearly gaining greater influence over private land use. However, they
represent an augmentation of, rather than a replacement for, their more
coercive cousins discussed above.
The right of eminent domain7 is an extreme form of public control
over private land that has been around for centuries. It expresses the
ancient notion that the sovereign has the authority to acquire private land
for public purposes even from an owner who does not wish to sell. This
authority rests on some permutation of the assumption that because the
sovereign makes property ownership possible and enforceable, she can take
a specific parcel back if it is needed for a public use. Eminent domain

70. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Liberatingthe PublicTrust Doctrinefrom Its HistoricShackles,
14 U.C. DAvis L.REv. 185 (1980).
71. A good general introduction with reference to natural resource conservation can be
found in Errol E.Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain:Historyand Policy, 11 ENVTL.
L. 1 (1980).
72. See id.; see generally NICHOLS ON EMINENT DoMAIN (Sackman Van Brunt ed., 3d ed.
1979).
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facilitates the construction, among other things, of linear or placedependent public works, such as lighthouses, highways, and harbors,
which could easily be thwarted by a single recalcitrant property owner who
refused to sell.
Incentives or subsidies to private landowners also have a long
history in environmental policy. The choice between cooperation and
incentives versus acquisition and regulation, for instance, split the
advocates of public forestry as early as 1911 and gave rise to a whole raft of
incentive-based legislation for private forests in the 1920s.73 Farmers also
were the recipients of a number of early incentives and subsidies,
articulated through cooperative extension programs at land grant
universities under the Morrill Act,74 as well as later incentives for improved
plowing techniques and land retirement under Roosevelt during the New
Deal?5 These agricultural incentives continue into the present day under the
"sodbuster," "swampbuster," and conservation reserve programs, as well
as tax breaks to those who keep their land in agricultural use under laws
like California's Williamson Act.76
More recently, however, we have witnessed some interesting and
more complex variations on incentive-based regulation of private lands. For
example, consider the ever-developing relationship between local and
federal laws regarding land use. In Marin County, California, local officials
have given private landowners a portion, of the money they needed to
comply with new federal and state regulations regarding water quality.'
This is an odd new form of public incentive that relies on a backdrop of
coercive federal standards. Or consider the Habitat Conservation Plan
(HCP), created by amendment to the ESA in 1982.78 HCPs allow a private

73.
74.

See DANA & FAiRFAX, supranote 50, at 123-32.
Act of July 2,1862, ch. 130,12 Stat. 503,503-05 (codified at 7 U.S.C.

§§

301-308 (1994)

(granting public lands to states and territories for the provision of colleges that benefit
agricultural and mechanical arts).
75. See generally JOHN OPIE, THE LAW OF THE LAND: Two HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN
FARMLAND PoLucy 146-60 (1987),

76. But the state pays counties for the lost tax revenues, and it is not clear what the public
is buying in the long run. See Christine Souza, Williamson Act funds are saved in new statebudget,
AGALERT (Sept.18,2002),availableathttp://www/cfbf.com/agalert/2002/091802-b-aa.html;
Lesli A. Maxwell, Budget Panel restores Williamson Act funding, FRESNO BEE (June 15, 2002),
availableat http://www.fresnobee.com/local/story/3199908p4248353c.html.
77. HART, supra note 67, at 62-65.
78. Under the amendments, exemptions from the ESA are available to those with an
approved HCP or who apply to the cabinet-level "God Squad" (Endangered Species
Committee) for a special exemption. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(e)-(o), 1539(a) (1994). The background
for this amendment is discussed in FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 2, at 38-42.
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property owner to obtain a permit to "take"' a small number of
endangered species or modify their habitat in exchange for other mitigation
efforts. Modifications to the program by the Clinton administration in the
1990s significantly expanded the popularity of HCPs. A new policy of "no
surprises," for example, encouraged private landowners to work with the
government to further protect species on their property, in exchange for a
guarantee that there would be no additional uncompensated mitigation
requirements from them, regardless of the species' condition down the
road.' In addition, a new "safe harbor" policy provided an incentive to
owners of private land suitable as habitat for an endangered species (but
presently unpopulated by any endangered creatures) to preserve that
habitat rather than eliminate it immediately to avoid any future ESA
restrictions.8'
Like zoning and other traditional regulatory approaches, these
alternatives are all implemented by public agencies. It is true that the actual
taking of land in an eminent domain proceeding is sometimes done by a
private corporation that has been delegated the power of condemnation.'
Even when a private corporation is executing or otherwise benefiting from
the transaction, however, or winds up as the ultimate titleholder, a goal in
the "public interest" is mandatory to justify use of the authority. The money
for the compensation comes from the public treasury, and the government
initially owns and controls the taken land.'
Unlike more coercive environmental regulations, however, and
with the exception of eminent domain, most of these policies are voluntary,
But this quality is often ambiguous in practice. HCPs are only voluntary to
the degree a private landowner is willing to otherwise refrain from
developing his land in violation of the ESA. This is a significant legal
restriction with stiff financial implications for many affected landowners,

79. The ESA meaning of the term "take" is to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)
(1994). Harm and harass are the most clearly expansive terms in the list and have produced
much litigation.
80. Sax, supra note 68, at 886.
81. Michael J. Bean, Sustainabilityand the Law:An Assessment of the EndangeredSpecies Act,
in NATURE AND HUMAN SocIETY: THE QUEST FOR ASUSTAINABLE WORLD 493,497-98 (Peter H.
Raven ed., 1997) (proceedings of the 1997 Forum on Biodiversity).
82. Discussed, briefly but with less insight than the accompanying references, in Raymond

& Fairfax, supra note 10, at 704-07. See particularly, Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law,
Expropriation,and ResourceAllocation by Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33 J.ECON.
HIST. 232,237-40 (1973).
83. Some scholars complain that the courts do not review condemnations adequately. See
generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater & William Lund Norine, Through the Looking Glass of Eminent
Domain: Exploring the ."Arbitrary and Capricious" Test and Substantive Rational Review of
Governmental Decisions, 16 B.C. ENvTL. AFF.L.REv. 661 (1989).
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calling the voluntary nature of the HCP into doubt. Even incentive-based
programs like agricultural subsidies can become less and less voluntary
over time. Incentive policies that exhibit significant political stability, like
many agricultural programs, tend to become incorporated into the price of
private land. This makes them much less "voluntary" for subsequent land
purchasers, who pay a higher price for the property based on the
assumption that the incentive will remain in place. Thus, while incentives
represent something other than a command-and-control regime, they risk
becoming more coercive and less voluntary over time rather than the
reverse.
Most of these alternatives also offer compensation to the landowner
for participation. Eminent domain and many incentive programs do so
explicitly; others like the HCP initiative do so more implicitly by providing
landowners with regulatory relief in exchange for certain actions that go
beyond the bare requirements of the law." The case of local governments
helping to fund compliance with federal regulations is especially intriguing
on this point. Here, involuntary compliance with a federal regulation is
subsidized by public dollars at the local level. This is an interesting twist on
what is sometimes called "cooperative federalism," in which the federal
government provided significant funding for targeted new programs to the
states. s
Finally, it is also worth noting that the multi-party negotiations
regarding modem programs like HCPs further fragment the institutional
setting for private land regulation. With the regulator and various private
stakeholders negotiating the content and enforcement of the rules, planning
has now become so complex in some settings that we have to set up
separate negotiation groups to figure out how to move the whole bundle of
entitlements and expectations forward. This is a new level of complexity for
the institutional fragmentation that characterized the Roosevelt-Pinchot era.
While some of these options for affecting private land use are
familiar and well-seasoned, others are new and innovative. Some of them
tinker with the involuntary qualities of earlier rules, adding a degree of
freedom for private owners without fully embracing a voluntary approach.
Others provide forms of compensation to help landowners comply with
new, coercive land use regulations. Still others dangle new financial
incentives in front of property owners, seducing them to adjust their use of
the land accordingly. Taken as a group, these new forms of regulating
private lands are indicative of the growing variety and complexity of

84. See supra notes 72 to 81 and accompanying text.
85. The term is attributed to Morton Grodzins and Daniel Elazar by James Q. Wilson. See
James Q. Wilson, The Rise of the BureaucraticState, PUB. INT., Fall 1975, at 77,91.
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approaches to that topic, however, rather than a dearly discernable shift
towards a voluntary, compensated, and private approach.
C. Summaryw-Do We See a Clear Shift?
Although they vary tremendously in their details, all of these
government policies seek to affect private land use. In this respect, they
serve as an important complement to the suite of public land policies
reviewed in part II. While sharing a focus on private land, each type of
policy seems to scramble public and private controls over private lands in
new and interesting ways. Title continues to remain (inmost cases) with the
landowner, but the public gains control over different aspects of land
management and use.
Thus, just as public lands once became marbled with private claims
and entitlements, so too are private lands becoming more riddled with
public encumbrances. The doctrines of the public trust and eminent domain
are examples of these public claims on private property that originated well
before the Progressive Era. Zoning and federal environmental regulations
add another layer of public entitlements as newer forms of coercive, noncompensated regulations affecting private land. All of these particular rules
reflect a bias towards an instrumental view of private property as
something subject to significant modification in service of the public
interest.
Some land use policies rely more on voluntary incentives and other
alternatives to coercive regulation. Agricultural incentive programs have
been around (in form if not in specific content) since the Progressive Era.'
Others, like HCPs and local funds to support compliance with federal
regulations, are more recent innovations. Voluntary and incentive-based
policies do seem more popular now than in the past, and it is clear that
some of the assumptions of the Progressive Era-for instance, that
mandatory regulations drafted by scientific experts will solve all our
problems-have eroded. Zoning and kindred coercive rules have arguably
receded in importance, at least for now.
But we do not seem headed in the direction of an unqualified
embrace of voluntary, compensated, private transactions. Coercive
alternatives like zoning, federal regulations, and the public trust doctrine
have not faded away. They remain a key influence on modem private land
use policy. Even voluntary incentives such as habitat conservation plans

86. Discussed in Dana Clark & David Downes, What PriceBiodiversit.y? Economic Incentives
and Biodiversity Conservation in the United States, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LIG. 9, 37-43 (1996). See
generally JOHN OPIE, THE LAW OF THE LAND: Two HuNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN FARMLAND
POuCY (1987), especially ch. 10.
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and soil conservation programs rely in part on a sense that private
ownership power is limited. Coercive powers held by the public provide an
important backdrop to these kinds of "voluntary" programs. Titles,
entitlements, expectations, multi-layered government roles, and
institutional forums for debating priorities and outcomes all seem to be
increasingly complicated as the line between public and private continues
to blur.
In short, we find the idea that we are shifting towards a system
favoring private ownership rights is too simple. Rather, we are seeing a
proliferation of complex and fragmented claims on private land, much as
we saw on the public domain 100 years ago. Most policies relating to
private land use encompass a mix of elements. It is less and less useful to
define them as "public" or "private," and more and more important to
explore exactly how the specifics of each arrangement vary. Nowhere is this
point more evident than in the paradigmatic "private" example of land
trusts.
IV. PRIVATE ACTIONS INFLUENCING PRIVATE LAND
USE-LAND TRUSTS
In this section we look at land trusts as the most promising
candidate for a truly voluntary, compensated, and private approach to land
conservation. The land trust appears, at first blush, to be the most
"Lockean" of the newly evolving conservation instruments affecting private
land. Yet land trusts also evince a wide mix of institutional and property
theory elements, combining an intrinsic respect for the rights of property
owners with an instrumental flexibility in defining and fragmenting the
various aspects of those private rights in pursuit of public goals. In the final
analysis, we conclude, they are no more clearly "voluntary, compensated,
and private" than the policies we reviewed in part III.
The term "land trust" has no specific legal content. Typically, it
refers to a nonprofit corporation registered under section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code that "works to conserve land by undertaking or
assisting direct land transactions-primarily the purchase or acceptance of
donations of land or easements." 7 However defined, land trusts are

87.

LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 1998 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF CONSERVATION LAND TRUSTS V

(1998). The relevant section of the I.R.S. code, 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) is
discussed in STEPHENJ. SMALL, THE FEDERALTAX LAW OFCONSERVATION EASEMENTS (1990) and
in JANET DiEHL & THOMAS S. BARRETr, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK: MANAGING

LAND CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION EASEMENT PROGRAMS (1988). See also Story

Clark &Stephen J.Small, Running the Numbers: The Math of Land Conservation Transactions,
in National Land Trust Rally, Baltimore, Maryland (Oct. 2001) (unpublished paper, on file with
author).
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proliferating rapidly: data from the Land Trust Alliance (LTA), the national
consortium of land trusts, indicate that since 1950 the number of
organizations fitting their definition and joining their group has jumped
from nearly none to more than 1200 today. (See Chart 1.) And, since 1988,
LTA data also indicate that the number of acres protected by land trusts has
increased by more than 135 percent.
The number of land trusts continues to grow in part because of
public enthusiasm, and, at least in some measure, because it has been the
goal of both the LTA and of many local, regional, and national land trusts
to ensure that that happens. The LTA runs courses throughout the nation
training interested groups on how to raise money, gain public support, and
write easements.' Large established trusts often support and encourage the
"fledging" of smaller peer organizations. This allows for a product mix in
the land trust market, but it also divides the landscape among ever more
diverse stakeholders, another interesting example of institutional
fragmentation. For example, at last count there were 119 land trusts in
California, 137 in Massachusetts, and 113 in Connecticut. 9 Intiny New
Hampshire alone, the ancient and mammoth Society for the Protection of
New Hampshire Forests (SPNHF) is but one of 38 land trusts. Many of these
organizations have no staff, no funds, and sometimes even no land or
easements to manage.
Land trusts are very much a regional phenomenon, most common
in New England, the mid-Atlantic states, and on the West Coast, and far
less common in the intermountain West and Southwest." The
overwhelming focus of trust activity is wild lands: wetlands, forests,
scenery, and open space. Only ten percent of the LTA member
9'
organizations even claim to protect urban lands (see Chart 2).

88. See, e.g., Land Trust Alliance, Land Trust Alliance Rally 2002, at http://www.lta.org/
training/rally.htm (last updated Aug. 20,2002).
89. It is not clear that all of these institutions are necessary. While the 119 in California
may make some sense, we wonder about the 137 in Massachusetts and the 113 in Connecticut.
90. Land Trust Alliance, National Land Trust Census: Charts and Graphs,at www.lta.org/
newsroom/census-charts.htm (posted Sept. 12, 2001). See also JOHN B. WRIGHT, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN DIVIDE: SELUNG&SAVING THE WEST(1993) for an interesting discussion of why land

trusts fit into the culture of Colorado but not of Utah.
91. Compare the following examples: (1) the commitment of the Trust for Public Land
(TPL) on the "about TPL" page of its website, at http://www.tpl.org (last visited Aug. 22,
2002), to "working exclusively to protect land for human enjoyment and well being. TPL helps
conserve land for recreation and spiritual nourishment and to improve the health and quality
of life of American communities." with (2) the Nature Conservancy's emphasis on science and
its mission to "preserve the plants, animals and natural communities that represent the
diversity of life on Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive." The Nature
Conservancy, About Us, at http://nature.org/aboutus (last visited Aug. 22, 2002).
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Land trusts conduct their business in three basic ways. What are
sometimes called "flip" or assisted transactions, in which a land trust
acquires a property that it then resells or otherwise transfers to a
government agency, account for over half of the acres land trusts claim to
have protected in 1990 (see Table 3). Other choices include conservation
easements and private reserves owned and managed by trusts for the longterm. Our discussion will focus on conservation easements, but all three
elements of land trust activity figure in our continuing search for a shift-toprivatization.
Table 3 - Land Trust Arrangements by Acreage
Acres Protected
Conservation easements
Owned by land trusts

2000
2,589,619
1,247,342

1990
450,385
435,522

Increase
475%
186%

Transferred to government
agencies and other
organizations

2,388,264

1,022,640

133%

TOTAL

6,225,225

1,908,547

226%

Source: Land Trust Alliance, www.LTA.org

A. Flip or Assisted Transactions"
In flip transactions, the land trust acquires land and transfers title
to the government at a later date. LTA data from Table 3 shows that
between one-third and one-half of the land "protected" by land trusts
actually winds up being paid for and managed by the government. Land
trusts act as procurers for the government for many reasons: landowners
may not want to deal with government bureaucrats, government
acquisition procedures may be too clunky and rule-bound to meet the
family and estate planning needs of potential sellers, or land trusts may be
able to move faster in a competitive market. A dissenting view argues,
however, that land trusts add little to traditional government land

92. Like the organizations themselves, the types of protection that land trusts extend are
deeply regionalized. Most of the flip transactions are in the Middle Atlantic States and the
West Coast; there are almost none in the Southwest.
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acquisition programs except for logistical support, advocacy, and frequently
a hefty surcharge. 3
In terms of our analysis, flip transactions are voluntary and
compensated-the landowner is not compelled to deal and she is paid-but
they are not really private. Ultimately the government pays for the land, in
cash and/or in the form of tax deductions for the donor. Indeed, additional
contributions of public funds may be compelled when land flipped to the
government goes off the property tax roles, with consequences for the local
tax base.94 These transactions are also not private in that the land is
ultimately owned and managed by the government (subject to whatever
restrictions the original seller was able to negotiate). The fact that these
deals allow private organizations to commandeer important elements of
government acquisition and management budgets is not new-many
private interests exist in large part to steer government programs toward
their priorities. However, neither is it private land conservation.
B. Conservation Easements
Like the term "land trust," a "conservation easement" has no
specific content.9 It is a contract negotiated by two parties that separates
some of the rights of ownership from the underlying fee title. The
landowner retains ownership of the land but transfers some use or
development options to the trust. The land trust also accepts responsibility
for monitoring and enforcing the contract. The transaction is registered as
a part of the deed to the property and constrains all future owners. Because
the easement typically lowers the value of the parcel, the landowner may
be entitled to lower property or estate taxes and may, if the easement was
donated, receive income tax benefits as well."

93. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SETING PRIORITIES FOR
LAND CONSERVATION: REPORTOF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMfITEE ON SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNICAL CRITERIA FOR FEDERAL ACQUISmON OF LANDS FOR CONSERVATION 22 (1993).

See alsoCarol W. LaGrasse, Wrongful Land TrustInvolvement in Government:Recommendation No.
14, at http://prfamerica.org/wrongfullandtrust.htm1 (last visited Aug. 22,2002).
94. This is not always true, however. When land is already covered by "current use" or
other farm or conservation oriented reduction of property taxes, the acquisition may not have
much tax impact at all.
95. The standard source is DIEHL & BARREmT, supra note 87, especially ch. 1.
%. Although "land trust" is a relatively new concept, the easement is not. Easements,
ways of necessity, and a myriad of divisions of rights, title, and access have characterized land
ownership for many centuries. However, the conservation easement is enjoying a currency and
application that is unprecedented. Our discussion draws on the website of the Maine Coastal
Heritage Trust. See Maine Coastal Heritage Trust, ConservationEasements, athttp://www.mcht.
org/easements.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2002). When a land trust acquires an easement, it
assumes major, long-term responsibilities. It must monitor the easement to ensure that the
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Land trusts and easements can be criticized for just this reason:
almost uniformly, easement deals are constructed to meet the specific
financial and real estate needs of the donor or seller. Conserved land thus
comes under protection because it is available to a land trust, not
necessarily because it is an appropriate parcel to conserve. The landowner,
rather than the trust, drives the process. Moreover, during negotiations
private landowners can reserve rights, exclude portions of the property in
order to allow construction of homes for children and grandchildren, and
generally define the nature of the protection on the land to suit their own
priorities.
Although easements are indeed compensated, it is important to
note the myriad ways in which they are not private and ultimately
troubling on the voluntary dimension. They are not private for a
combination of three reasons. The tax benefits that facilitate most easement
deals are an expenditure of public funds. In other cases, government
agencies provide funds directly to private iand trust groups to purchase
easements. In the extreme case, the land trust itself may be a public
entity-many conservation easements are entered into by government
agencies specifically constituted as land trusts for acquiring them.9'
The U.S. Forest Service's Forest Legacy Program (FLP) is a typically
complex public/private land trust arrangement. The FLP provides funds to
acquire conservation easements and creates a "partnership" between state
and local governments, land trusts, and interested landowners to conserve
"environmentally important forests" in participating states. The
participating state or local governments provide at least a 25 percent match
for FLP funds, and they may hold the easement as well. The landowner
typically retains management responsibilities for the land, and a private
land trust typically monitors the easement. In the seven-year period ending
in April 2000, the government protected 111,000 acres under the FLP,
contributing half of the funding to achieve related projects valued at over
$54 million.98
The interplay of public and private under the easement can become
even more confusing. Conservation easements held by land trusts are

terms of the contract are complied with. It must act to enforce the easement, including
litigation if necessary. Further, it must educate new owners of the underlying fee and the
community about the nature and importance of the restrictions contained in the easement.
97. Organizations in Massachusetts, Maryland, and New Jersey come immediately to
mind. The role of states and state attorneys general in running land trusts and enforcing
private easements was extensively discussed in Sylvia Bates & William Silberstein, The Role
of State Attorneys General in Developing and Enforcing Conservation Easements, National
Land Trust Rally, Portland, Oregon (Oct. 21, 2000) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
98. See U.S. FORESTSERv.,DEP'TOFAGRIC., FORESTLEGACYPROGRAMOVERVIEW 2 (June 20,
2000), availableat http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/coop/legacy-overview.PDF.
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sometimes woven into local zoning and planning programs. This occurs
when trusts acquire easements as part of the formal implementation of a
county plan, as has happened in Matin County, California." More complex
still, a land trust might monitor and enforce easements extracted from
developers by county planners as a part of a permitting process. In those
instances, the transactions begin to look not only "not private," but also less
and less voluntary and compensated as well.1"
As in the case of government incentives, the problem of future
ownership transfers also threatens to erode the voluntary nature of the
conservation easement. Subsequent land buyers, who may be more or less
aware of and enthusiastic about the easement, will not likely view it as a
voluntary encumbrance in the same manner as the original owner. This is
why a land trust must monitor the easement in perpetuity to insure that the
terms of the contract are complied with. If a downstream owner violates the
terms or wishes to do something other than what the original grantor
intended, the land trust must take action to enforce the easement, including
litigation if necessary.
Although it is possible to imagine a conservation easement
arrangement that is voluntary, compensated, and private, such an
arrangement appears to be neither inevitable nor the norm. The financing
of easements almost always involves public funding of one sort or another.
The extent to which government regulation is involved in compelling the
donation of easements varies, but in instances where that is an explicit or
implicit element of the transaction, it is difficult to view easements as
voluntary.
C. Private Reserves
Not infrequently, a land trust makes a fee acquisition with the
intention of holding and managing the property on a continuing basis. This
is the strongest example of a private alternative to public land use
incentives and regulation. Private reserves, rather than conservation
easements, would appear as the archetypal private, voluntary, compensated
conservation transaction. For example, imagine that a group of private
individuals wants a tract of land protected. They join together to buy it from
the owner and protect it. No appropriated funds are involved and no
government resources are committed to long-term management. While only

99. See generally ELLEN RILLA & ALVIN D. SOKOLOW, CALIFORNIA FARMERS AND
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: MOTIVATIONS, EXPERIENCES AND PERCEPTIONS IN THREE COUNIES

(2000).
100. See FAIRFAX

& GUENzLER, supra note 2, at 195-98.
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a small percentage of land trust transactions are of this type, surely one
might conclude that they at least represent a truly "private" alternative.
Typically, however, even these deals depend upon public money.
Some acquisitions involve corporate sponsors seeking public relations
benefits. Individual and corporate contributions to preserve acquisitions are
also typically viewed as charitable donations by the Internal Revenue
Service.' So, while the seller of the land enters the deal voluntarily and is
undeniably compensated, even this type of transaction is not appropriately
considered wholly private. The transaction almost inevitably will include
tax benefits for the seller, hence an infusion of government funds.
D. Summary-Are Land Trusts a True Example of "Private" Land
Conservation?
As in part I, we are left with a rather muddled picture of the
degree of "privateness" in land trust activities. Land trusts suffer from the
same mixing of public and private claims that we saw in other strategies for
conservation on private lands. While the remarkable rise of land trusts in
the 1990s as yet another institution to control private land use is
indisputable, their existence as some sort of clean, private alternative to
public action is not. In fact, between one-third and one-half of these
"privately" conserved lands wind up in government ownership down the
road. Among those that do not, tenure arrangements are getting more and
more complex, rather than shifting towards some sort of private propertybased ideal.
V. ARE WE RESHAPING PROGRESSIVE ERA NOTIONS
OF PROPERTY?
This empirical analysis is not promising for a shift to private
conservation story. Yet there is another argument to be considered: perhaps
ideasabout property and policy are outpacing our political outcomes. While
it seems clear, in other words, that our policies have yet to "shift"
discernably to a new position, maybe our larger ideas of property law and
theory are paving the way for bigger policy changes down the road. Again
drawing on the framework in part II, such a movement would be towards
a return to intrinsic, Lockean ideas of private property and away from
alternative instrumental concepts.
In this section we will briefly consider this possibility. Are we
rejecting key components of Progressive Era property notions, or are we
moving on to new and different combinations of intrinsic and instrumental

101.

See Clark & Downs, supra note 86, at 23-24.
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ideas about property? We focus our discussion on three key elements of the
Progressive Era changes in our understanding of property: (1) the
abstraction of owners and subjects of ownership; (2) the separation of title
from control and multiplying estates in resources; and (3) the changing
powers of ownership.
A. Abstractions as Owners and Subjects of Ownership
The Progressive Era idea of property was increasingly willing to
deal with intangibles. Artificial entities like corporations became common
owners of property. 2 Land was fragmented into diverse resources with
different owners and managers, and abstract and non-physical items like
ideas and revenue streams became the subject of ownership claims. 3 If we
are witnessing a return to Locke and the intrinsic paradigm of ownership
under the shift to privatization narrative, therefore, we ought to see
movement off this trajectory in the direction of more physical and less
abstract forms of ownership.
In reality, we see almost none of that-indeed, we find that the land
trust approach to conservation is very much dependent on the abstraction
of property that characterized the Progressive Era. The idea of separating
development rights, or other management choices from the underlying fee
by means of a conservation easement, is simply a further splintering of the
landowner's bundle of sticks. And, selling or donating those rights depends
on the late nineteenth century idea that ownership in title can be separated
from ownership of income from the land. Thus a conservation easement
embraces the Progressive Era abstraction of ownership.
Perhaps more interestingly, the conservation easement seems to
eradicate some elements of a private property right entirely. The use and
development rights restricted by an easement are arguably relegated, as one
irate critic has styled it, "to the dustbin of history." 5 If the easement works
as intended, those rights will never again reappear in connection with the
parcel. In addition, the easement holder does not pay taxes on the acquired
development value; it also seems to disappear." 6 The dustbin notion may
be slightly overwrought-if the land trust holding the easement should

102. See supra notes 30 to 32 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 26 to 38 and accompanying text.
104. Raymond & Fairfax, supra note 10, at 695-98.
105. James Burling, Conservation Easements, Comments at the Wise Use Conference (May
1999), quoted in Carol W. LaGrasse, Land Trusts Threaten Private Property, in 5 POSMONS ON
PROPERTY 1, 2 (2000), availableat http://www.prfamerica.org/landtruststhreatenpp.html.

106. Thus the private transaction involves a very involuntary loss of tax revenues at the
local level, determined by a process that has little or no formal accountability to public decision
makers.
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ultimately acquire the underlying fee, the development rights, under the
concept of merger, are rejoined to the land." However, the fundamental
point remains that a relatively abstract notion of what can be owned and
traded that characterized the Progressive Era has not been reversed-it is
a basic element of the land trust operation.
B. The Separation of Ownership and Control
The Progressive Era was also characterized by a growing separation
of ownership from control, as well as a tendency to divide a single
landscape among multiple owners."° This trajectory is also not reversed or
altered but relied upon and intensified in the era of land trusts. A
conservation easement, for example, gives the land trust powerful control
over future use of the property, while fee title and management thereof
remains with the original owner."° Frequently, the government subsidizes
or funds the purchase of these private use rights without controlling which
parcels are acquired.110 These arrangements are a far cry from the Lockean
notion of a unified parcel of rights owned in full by a single person.
Furthermore, each parcel of land is managed according to a unique
contract negotiated between a land trust and landowner, each with distinct
goals, financial priorities, and legal obligations. In the future, different
owners will frequently manage different aspects of a specific parcel under
the land trust model. This is not unlike the modern residue of early
twentieth century fragmentation on public lands that finds the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior managing the
minerals estate on National Forests, the surface estate of which is managed
by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) in the Department of Agriculture."' The
late twentieth century has complicated that pattern, adding the possibility
that both the BLM and the USFS will be cooperating under different
programs with different land trusts in management of the same landscape.
Finally, these various parties are now responsible for the management of
the easement-encumbered landscape in coordination with owners who are

107. This is why some land trust specialists recommend that those owning conservation
properties in fee donate an easement to a separate organization. Fragmenting the title would
prevent the property from being an attractive target for a judgment creditor. See FAIRFAX &
GUENZLER, supra note 2, at 188-90.
108. See discussion supra part II.
109. DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 5.
110. See discussion supra partl.
111. See the Multiple-Use-Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994) (stating,
"Nothing herein shall be construed so as to affect the use or administration of the mineral
resources of national forest lands" (i.e., they will remain under the jurisdiction of the BLM)).
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managing 1interspersed
parcels without the intervening factor of
2
easements.
C. The Powers of Ownership
We find the most interesting changes, however, in our everchanging limits on the powers of private ownership. As command-andcontrol regulations steadily reduced the rights of private property owners
during the Progressive Era and beyond, we witnessed a growing influence
of the weaker, instrumental concept of property over the intrinsic view. But
as it was on the public lands, the influence of the instrumental has been
limited on private properties as well. The instrumental perspective has been
an augmentation, not a replacement, of the Lockean outlook in American
political economy. As the instrumental weakening of private property
rights through the public trust, eminent domain, zoning, and other
regulations peaked, resistance on intrinsic grounds increased. After some
significant losses to Cohen, we might style it, Locke has been digging in his
heels of late and gaining purchase. But the renewed emphasis on Lockean
ideas in the modem era does not resemble a shift back to intrinsic ideas of
ownership; significant instrumental assumptions remain in the system.
What we are seeing instead are more complex and sophisticated (and thus
fragmented) policies that balance intrinsic and instrumental principles of
ownership in new and different ways.
In the face of modem hostility from property rights advocates,
Cohenesque notions of property owners' social responsibility to the
collective good have been eroded. A number of decisions in modem takings
jurisprudence indicate this gradual waning of Cohen's ideas." 3 In
particular, the 1992 decision in Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCouncil was
hailed as a victory by defenders of private property by requiring
compensation for regulations that eliminate all of a property's economic
value, except where the regulation prohibits a land use already considered
a nuisance under the common law of the state." 4 This new restriction on
public claims against private property represents the high-water mark (to
date) for the Lockean, intrinsic notion of property in the present era.
Legal scholars sympathetic to environmental regulations have
condemned Lucas for grounding private ownership rights on an inflexible
and outdated common law standard. Two leading proponents of this view
112. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 2103(C) (1994). See also FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supranote 2, at
ch. 9.
113. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.

1003 (1992); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
114. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29.
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are legal scholars Joseph Sax and Eric Freyfogle. n 5 Both writers are
environmentalists working solidly within the instrumental tradition that
property rights must change to reflect shifting social goals and norms over
time. "As much as any body of law," concludes Freyfogle, "property law
[has] evolved in response to the felt needs of the American people." 1 6 Sax
offers multiple examples of changes in the law of property from both the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries," 7 while Freyfogle speaks more
generally of the shift in ownership powers as industry overtook agriculture
as the dominant economic priority of the country"' Both argue
emphatically that property must continue to be evaluated based upon the
changing goals and values of the community at large, and not by some
relatively static, nineteenth century notion derived from the common law.
What both authors offer, in response to the growing influence of the
Lockean approach in modem takings law, is an entirely new Cohenesque
view of property. Down but not out, they argue for a new ecological,rather
than social, imperative to restrict the power of private property. While not
fully described by either author, this emerging ecological mandate would
require landowners to provide adequate soil and water supplies for
endangered ecosystems, preserve critical wetlands, and protect
undeveloped barrier islands to prevent future coastal erosion."9 Sax bases
these restrictions on private property owners in what he calls the "economy
of nature."""0 Under this new paradigm of legal thought, land is viewed as
providing important ecological services in its natural, undeveloped state,
and landowners are sometimes required to avoid interfering with those
services, without compensation by the public. Indeed, for Sax, property in
land needs to become more of a usufruct than a Blackstonian right of
absolute dominion. 2' Freyfogle concurs with this view, arguing that "a
much more inductive, empirical, contingent inquiry is needed to decide
what it means, at any given time and place, to own a piece of the Earth."'"
Despite their resonance with instrumental ideas of property dating
back to Cohen, the positions of Sax and Freyfogle differ from earlier
instrumental arguments in ways that signal a new diversity of modem
perspectives on property. For example, their emphasis is on ecology, rather
than social justice concerns, as the driving norm for limiting property rights.

115. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433 (1993); Freyfogle, supranote 31.
116. Freyfogle, supranote 31, at 98.
117. Sax, supranote 115, at 1447-48.
118. Freyfogle, supra note 31, at 98-102.
119. See id. at 78; Sax, supra note 115, at 1440.
120. Sax, supranote 115, at 1443.
121. Id. at 1452.
122. Freyfogle, supra note 31, at 121.
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This is not to argue that either author rejects limitations on property for
reasons other than ecological ones. But such concerns are conspicuously
absent from the visions they present. Freyfogle, in particular, speaks in
sweeping terms of an imminent "age of ecology" in which property will be
re-shaped primarily, it seems, to serve environmental ends. "2 Meanwhile,
Sax's alternative to the strong property rights of old is grounded in an
"economy of nature," and not an economy of social justice or welfare. 24
This is a substantial change of target compared to the economic and social
objectives that served as the primary restraints on private property during
the Progressive Era." While understandable given the high profile of
environmental regulations in modem takings law, this change of focus may
nevertheless have some unfortunate equity implications in how we
approach our conservation goals in the coming years, as will be discussed
further in part VI below.
Perhaps more interestingly, it is unclear to what degree these new,
ecological objectives for property are themselves subject to change over
time in the true instrumental tradition. While the details of the new
ecological objectives are not entirely specified, the need to protect them
seems surprisingly absolute. It is true that Freyfogle concludes his paper by
suggesting that property rights will eventually move into yet another age
beyond the ecological one, the specific principles of which remain
undetermined. 26 Sax, by contrast, does not raise the issue of future changes
in property beyond the economy of nature at all. But both authors rely
heavily on the idea that we have far exceeded the "carrying capacity"1" of
many ecosystems, and therefore are going to have to restrain ourselves in
the foreseeable future. Given this "limits to growth" perspective, it is
unclear when or under what conditions either author would envision the
new ecological objectives they support receding in importance."2 Indeed,
the more likely outcome seems to be that ecological priorities will remain
a perpetual restraint on private property rights in the indefinite future.
The seemingly perpetual nature of these ecological imperatives
leads to an ironic result. By embracing what are likely to be defacto fixed

123. Id. at 138.
124. Sax, supra note 115, at 1445-46.
125. As presented so effectively in Cohen's work. See, e.g., Cohen, Propertyand Sovereignty,
supra note 26.
126. Freyfogle, supra note 31, at 138.
127. "Carrying capacity" is the common ecological concept indicating the maximum
number of living things that can be supported by a specific habitat or ecosystem. See JAMES H.
SHAW, INTRODUCTIoN TO WILDUFE MANAGEMENT 34 (1985).
128. The "limits to growth" idea that exponential human population and economic
expansion cannot continue without causing ecological collapse dates back to the work of
Donella Meadows and others. See DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL, THE LIMrIS TO GROWTH (1972).
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standards for restraining private property, the "economy of nature" version
of ownership shares some qualities of the intrinsic view it is criticizing.
There is a sense in which the right to a functioning ecosystem is in effect a
new intrinsicright of property held by all citizens. Indeed, Freyfogle more
or less acknowledges this point, noting that his complaint is not regarding
an absolute notion of property rights per se, but rather about who gets to
own what. 2 ' A citizen's right to a healthy, functioning wetland, for
example, on Freyfogle's account is much like an easement of sorts that
prevents an owner from draining his land for development. And this seems
like a property right that is unlikely to change or recede in the foreseeable
future, which gives it a rather more intrinsic and less instrumental quality.
There is, in effect, something of a "natural right to nature" emerging in
these essays-another surprising new way in which Locke's ideas and
Cohen's are coming together in the modem era.
There has been no simple return to Locke. Rather, we find that
property ideas are becoming more complex even as the influence of the
Progressive Era is challenged and reshaped. Indeed, some of the fiercest
opponents to strong private property rights, like Sax and Freyfogle, almost
seem to co-opt the intrinsic ideas of Locke and others in order to use them
to protect ecosystem health and functioning. Fragmentation of the idea of
property, the resources themselves, and the actors who control them,
continues apace. Rather than rejecting instrumental property principles, we
are in fact building upon the ideas that justified various forms of public
land ownership to adjust and rebalance our understanding of ownership
and conservation on private lands.
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The changes in private land conservation we have noted thus far
strike us as subtle, interesting, and potentially significant for theoretically
inclined students of property, government, and land conservation. In this
section, however, we try to sort out why all this should matter to
practitioners.
We begin with our basic observation: beware of simple stories
about land conservation policy. Things are getting more complex and
fragmented, not less so, as the line between public and private continues to
move and blur. We need to rely less on the idea that "public" and "private"
alternatives form some kind of clear dichotomy of policy options, and more
on the idea that most policies and resulting tenure arrangements are a blend
of the two. The key question for practitioners then becomes which
particular policy options are most effective when taken as a complete

129.

Freyfogle, supra note 31, at 102-03.
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package for a given parcel of land. Arguments by advocates (like the one at
the start of our article) that private property remains sacrosanct or
ideologically pure of public claims in practice should be taken with a large
grain of salt.
Although we have not located a shift to privatization, nevertheless,
conservation at the beginning of the twenty-first century is meaningfully
different from what was in the works at the start of the twentieth. These
differences, especially related to the rise of land trusts, hold important
policy implications as well. First, we see the emergence of new decision
makers. The government, we have repeatedly emphasized, has not
withdrawn from the land conservation arena. Federal, state, and local
policies continue to direct private land use. Tax policy and direct
government appropriations provide many of the financial resources that
drive ostensibly private land protections. However, government has ceded
significant control over decisions directing the expenditure of these public
funds and selecting which lands are to be conserved and on what terms.
Many of these decisions are now made by private groups catering to those
who own land and have sufficient resources to take advantage of the tax
and other incentives provided by the government.
Second, we see changing forums for monitoring and accountability.
The interplay-or lack thereof-between land trust activities and the more
public, participatory, and accountable public planning process is a critical
issue for practitioners. These private groups and individuals are, for most
purposes, significantly removed from public scrutiny, public accountability,
and public participation. Choices are made by private groups governed by
privately selected, frequently self-replicating boards."s Not only is the
process not public, but also the proliferation of organizations is difficult to
locate, track, and monitor, making it extremely difficult for members of the
public to identify what this phalanx of new organizations is doing and to
hold them accountable.
Finally, what is being conserved is changing. While there are major
advantages in pursuing conservation through voluntary and compensated
transactions with private owners, the approach does have consequences for
the types of land conserved. The lands protected by land trusts are not,
generally speaking, the large integrated tracts we associate with public
ownership131 but rather a patchwork of deeply encumbered and partially

130. Issues of accountability and self-replicating boards are discussed in FAuRFAx&
GUENZLER, supranote 2, especially ch. 11.

131. This is not to argue that all federal lands are large integrated tracts. Rather, we argue
that to the degree that land trust holdings are likely to be even less integrated than the average
National Forest, say, in terms of tenure arrangements, they are likely to experience even more
of the difficulties of administration that bedevil "checkerboard" lands and other scattered and
disaggregated federal holdings.
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developed holdings. Similarly, we are not in general acquiring recreation
access or other amenities that typically come with federal land ownership.
Most landowners prefer not to have their underlying fee available to
recreationists. For example, less than ten per cent of the land under
easement in the Bay Area is open to the public. 32 The heavy emphasis is on
wetlands and other parcels valuable for their ecological attributes rather
than their importance for public use and enjoyment.
All of this has very clear consequences for equitable distribution of
environmental goods and services. We fully recognize that the established
bureaucratic/democratic process in public land management has not been
particularly welcoming of or responsive to urban poor or minorities, either
as consumers of public resources, or as participants in the management
process." Nevertheless, we cannot be sanguine about the implications of
dosing the door even further in this field, just as minorities reach the status
of electoral majorities in many jurisdictions.
This is especially important given the ironic effect of many
conservation easements and land trust actions on private land values. .In
many communities, land values on properties under conservation easement
appear to go up significantly, in part because of the guaranteed amenities
of open space. Thus, landowners may well be receiving double
compensation for their transaction, first as tax credits or payments for the
easement, second as increased value on the remainder interest in their
property. The equity implications of this kind of outcome are troubling, to
say the least, given the involvement of public funds in financing the original
transactions.
In addition, we have noted that the shift of attention from public to
private lands has redefined Progressive ideas in favor of instrumental
property rights in ways that no longer serve inner-city/low wage
communities. Cohen's Progressive arguments about property underwrote
the development of many regulatory regimes (providing for a minimum
wage, worker protections, inner city beautification, etc.) that were designed
to benefit segments of society excluded from the gains of industrialization
in the Gilded Age. Those ideas have continued to support programs of that
ilk. However, as the property rights folks assert ever more strongly the
sanctity of Lockean understandings of ownership, we fear that the
conservation community may be allowing the social justice side of the
132. Darla Guenzler, Ensuring the Promise of Conservation Easements: The Use and Management of Conservation Easements by San Francisco Bay Area Organizations, at 13 (May 14,
1999), at http://www.openspacecouncil.org/Documents/Easements/EnsuringThe Promise.
pdf (last visited Aug. 28,2002).
133. As an example, see generally Kathy Hall, Impacts of the Energy Industry on the Navajo
and Hopi, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 130

(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994).
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equation to wither in favor of an assertion of ecological "rights" against
private property. The instrumental goals of Cohen's property theory are in
danger of being redefined away from a comnitment to social concerns such
as public health and living wages and toward a social obligation to protect
nature.
Even more disconcerting is the fact that these very public
implications appear shielded by the rhetoric of the shift to privatization
narrative. Calling an institution or a transaction "private" tends to exempt
it from public scrutiny. A nominally private contract negotiation between
a land trust and a landowner is not necessarily on the radar screen of even
attentive conservationists, to say nothing of urban minorities who are
marginal participants even in the ubiquitous electoral and notice and
comment procedures for public participation and involvement. It will not
become clear until years or decades pass the degree to which reliance on
easements as a means to control urban sprawl represents a "contracting
out" of the public function of land use regulation and enforcement thereof.
These transactions are occult to all but the cognoscenti and those
sufficiently well-heeled to have a parcel of land "worth protecting" on the
block.
The problem of shielding land use decisions from normal public
debate through the easement negotiation process is exacerbated by the
proliferation of easement negotiators. The number of land trusts constitutes
a major problem with public scrutiny. It is hard enough to keep up with the
multitude of review documents issued routinely by public land managers.
The additional task of identifying relevant land trusts and holding their toes
to the fire may further exclude already marginal participants from the
process.
The exclusionary effect of regarding these transactions as private
is as ironic as it is obvious. We have argued in the past that the publicprivate distinction that arose in connection with public lands was in
significant measure inaccurate given the extent to which ostensibly public
lands were riddled with private claims. And we have argued herein that the
effect of the emergence of private institutions, tools, and rhetoric has further
diminished the utility and content of the public-private distinction. It is
sadly ironic, then, that the rhetoric of private conservation has potentiated
the distinction between public and private land even as the differences
between the two become less and less obvious.
These concerns are difficult to get around. But it is important to
note in conclusion that the emphasis on the landed gentry does not inhere
inevitably in the land trust/conservation easement instrument. There are
parallel efforts to use the same land trust approach, in what are called
community land trusts (CLTs), to provide assistance to low and moderate
income people in many realms, most notably finding affordable housing.
A CLT is a non-profit corporation that acquires and holds land for the
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benefit of the community. Unlike a traditional land trust, in this case the
land is used for affordable housing or local businesses. These organizations
are no more private than the other land trusts we have discussed, but they
do apply the trust model to a different set of goals including local
community development and private home ownership.13"
Similarly, some of the larger land trusts are also beginning to
recognize the impact that their activities have on the availability of land for
housing and are taking steps to offset that impact. For example, SPNHF, a
consistent innovator in the field of land conservation, has developed a
program in which it invests a considerable portion of its endowment in a
local affordable housing project. The Trust for Public Land has instituted a
program that assists Indian Tribes in creating transactions to reacquire
sacred lands and sites lost during the Dawes Act 35 era of creating
allotments on reservations and opening the rest to homesteading.
The land trustas an institutional alternative, then, is not specifically
or necessarily antithetical to the interests of urban poor and other
traditional non-participants in the land conservation game. As community
land trusts and their affordable housing initiatives demonstrate, some
advantage for the poor and the disenfranchised can potentially be achieved
by lowering the price of housing, or land for housing, through trust
activities. This is not a distortion of the notion embodied, for example, in
the conservation easement. However, it is without question an atypical
outcome. Land trusts will, like SPNHF, have to work very much outside
their normal envelope if they are going to have a role in the equitable
distribution of land conservation and protection benefits. To date, this
potential of the land trust movement is unrealized.
The "shift to privatization" narrative could be just another halftruth or over-simplification in the world of public discourse were it not for
equity implications like these. To the degree that narratives shape our
understanding, however, allowing this latest story to grow unchecked may
create real mischief in the world of conservation policy. To the degree we
disregard all these equity implications because we think these are "private"
alternatives to regulation, we are only fooling ourselves. We conclude that
we need a different story, one that recognizes the complexities of these
emergent methods for influencing private land use and worries very much
about their equity implications.

134. See generally www.nclt.org; www.icedt.org.
135. Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-354
(1994)).

